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Abstract  The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  compare,  for  countries  with  different  legal  envi-
ronments, the  degree  to  which  boards  of  directors  may  improve  corporate  ethical  behaviour
by designing  codes  of  ethics.  These  codes  address  issues  such  as  a  company’s  responsibility
regarding  the  quality  of  its  products  and  services,  compliance  with  laws  and  regulations,  con-
ﬂicts of  interest,  corruption  and  fraud,  and  protection  of  the  natural  environment.  Using  a
sample of  ﬁrms  from  12  countries,  we  obtain  evidence  that  a  greater  presence  of  independent
directors on  the  board  leads  to  the  existence  of  more  complex  codes  of  ethics.  Moreover,  there
are signiﬁcant  differences  between  countries  with  high  levels  and  countries  with  low  levels
of investor  protection  as  regards  the  effectiveness  of  independent  directors  in  constrainingBoard  of  directors;
Corporate
governance
unethical  behaviour  by  managers.
© 2014  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the
CC BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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YIntroduction
The  effects  of  scandals  involving  fraud,  corruption,  etc.  on  a
company’s  image,  proﬁtability,  and  long-term  survival  have
heightened  the  corporate  concerns  regarding  ethics  and  led
to  the  development  and  implementation  of  ethical  codes
(Fan  et  al.,  2008).  These  codes  contribute  to  formalizing
the  corporate  values,  institutionalizing  the  guidelines  for
∗ Corresponding author at: Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Cam-
pus Miguel de Unamuno, 37007 Salamanca, Spain.
Tel.: +34 923 29 45 00x3132; fax: +34 923 29 47 15.
E-mail address: lrodomin@usal.es (L. Rodríguez Domínguez).
(
2
i
f
a
2
t
t
e
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2014.07.001
2340-9436/© 2014 ACEDE. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. Th
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).ecision  making  within  the  organization,  and  laying  down
tandards  for  responsible  behaviour  (McKinney  et  al.,  2010;
ingh,  2011).
Various  international  agencies  and  organizations  (New
ork  Stock  Exchange,  2003;  OCDE,  2004) and  researchers
García-Sánchez  et  al.,  2008;  Rodríguez  Domínguez  et  al.,
009) have  considered  the  role  of  the  board  of  directors
n  business  ethics.  In  this  sense,  this  body  is  responsible
or  supervising  the  senior  management  and  for  preventing
nd/or  punishing  inappropriate  behaviour  (Schwartz  et  al.,
005).  The  need  for  the  involvement  and  commitment  of
he  senior  management  and  its  delegate  bodies  to  ensure
he  effectiveness  of  an  ethics  programme  has  been  specially
mphasized  (Weaver  et  al.,  1999).
is is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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Among  the  desirable  features  of  the  board’s  functioning
or  business  ethics,  its  independence  stands  out.  It  ensures
reater  effectiveness  in  the  control  of  the  senior  manage-
ent  (Hermalin  and  Weisbach,  1988;  Zahra  and  Pearce,
989).  Furthermore,  it  has  a  decisive  inﬂuence  on  the
esign  of  strategies  for  corporate  responsibility  (Jo  and
arjoto,  2011)  and  ethical  strategies  (García-Sánchez  et  al.,
008).  The  ﬁnal  goal  is  to  limit  managers’  opportunities
or  self-beneﬁt  and  the  high  direct  costs  associated  with
alpractice,  such  as  ﬁnes  and  prison  sentences,  as  well  as
egative  media  exposure  and  the  consequent  damage  to  the
rm’s  reputation  (Johnson  and  Greening,  1999).
On  the  other  hand,  Ravina  and  Sapienza  (2010)  argued
hat  independent  directors  are  economic  agents,  whose
ecisions  may  be  inﬂuenced  by  their  own  interests.  More-
ver,  they  are  subject  to  the  institutional  environment  in
hich  they  operate  (Bebchuk  and  Weisbach,  2010),  which
etermines  the  type  and  functioning  of  the  control  mecha-
isms  (La  Porta  et  al.,  2000).
Therefore,  previous  studies  have  suggested  the  impor-
ance  of  the  board  of  directors  regarding  its  active  role  in
thical  practices,  its  monitoring  role,  and  the  relevance  of
ts  independence  as  a  positive  feature  that  may  encour-
ge  stricter  ethical  behaviour.  Based  on  these  premises,
his  study  examines  the  level  of  involvement  of  indepen-
ent  directors  in  the  development  of  ethical  codes.  In
ther  words,  we  attempt  to  determine  whether  indepen-
ent  directors  promote  the  implementation  of  ethics  codes
ddressing  a  wider  range  of  issues.  It  also  studies  whether
his  involvement  varies  according  to  the  level  of  investor
rotection  present  in  the  institutional  environment  in  which
he  company  operates.
Along  this  line,  the  level  of  investor  protection  is  con-
idered  to  be  one  of  the  most  important  factors  among
he  characteristics  of  the  institutional  environment.  It  may
ontribute  to  explaining  the  presence  or  absence  of  oppor-
unistic  behaviour  by  managers  (Benos  and  Weisbach,  2004)
nd/or  their  misappropriation  of  investors’  rights  (Dyck
nd  Zingales,  2004).  Such  expropriation  or  opportunistic
ehaviour  by  internal  agents  can  take  the  form  of  the  per-
onal  use  of  company  assets,  acquisition  strategies  that
estroy  value,  accounting  manipulation,  bribery,  corrup-
ion,  etc.  (Morck  et  al.,  1990).  However,  there  is  no  clear
vidence  of  interaction  with  the  institutional  environment
hat  could  inﬂuence  the  behaviour  of  independent  direc-
ors.
Previous  research  has  produced  conﬂicting  results;
lthough  a  substitutive  relationship  has  been  shown  to  exist
etween  the  institutional  environment  and  the  character-
stics  of  the  board  of  directors  (Aggarwal  et  al.,  2009),
any  authors  have  observed  a  lower  degree  of  opportunis-
ic  behaviour  by  managers,  such  as  accounting  manipulation
r  information  asymmetries,  in  countries  where  the  investor
rotection  is  stronger  (Ball  et  al.,  2000;  Bhattacharya  et  al.,
003;  Leuz  et  al.,  2003;  Bushman  et  al.,  2004).  On  the
ther  hand,  there  is  no  empirical  evidence  of  an  interaction
etween  the  two  factors  with  respect  to  the  design  of  cor-
orate  strategies  (Bebchuk  and  Weisbach,  2010).  Therefore,
e  propose  that  countries  with  strong  investor  protection
ffer  a  more  suitable  context  for  independent  directors  in
rder  to  implement  more  complex  codes,  whereas  these
irectors  in  countries  with  less  investor  protection  would
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ace  greater  reluctance  to  implement  mechanisms  that
estrain  opportunistic  behaviour.
Taking  these  considerations  into  account,  our  study
akes  a  new  contribution  that  copes  with  both  perspectives:
he  importance  of  the  board’s  independence  as  a  corpo-
ate  governance  mechanism  in  the  implementation  of  ethics
odes  and  the  difference  in  involvement  according  to  the
ontext  in  which  the  company  operates.
The  two  perspectives  are  combined  in  the  proposal  of
ur  research  model,  in  which  the  scope  of  ethics  codes
s  expressed  as  a  function  of  board  independence,  its
nteraction  with  the  investor  protection  existing  in  the  envi-
onment,  and  some  control  variables.  To  test  this  model,  we
se  a  panel  data  sample  made  up  of  5380  observations  for  an
verage  of  760  companies  from  12  countries,  for  the  time
eriod  2003--2009.  The  ﬁnancial  data  were  obtained  from
ompustat,  whereas  the  data  on  corporate  governance  and
thics  were  extracted  from  the  EIRIS  database.
Our  ﬁndings  point  out  that  independent  directors  posi-
ively  inﬂuence  the  implementation  of  codes  with  a  wider
cope,  with  an  ethical  commitment  that  extends  beyond  the
iscrimination  and  the  adequate  relationships  with  providers
nd  clients.  This  compromise  encompasses  a  wider  range  of
thical  issues,  affecting  the  sustainable  use  of  resources  and
he  overall  relationship  with  society.  The  ﬁndings  obtained
re  in  accordance  with  previous  studies  (e.g.  Ibrahim  and
ngelidis,  1995;  Johnson  and  Greening,  1999),  which  empha-
ize  the  potential  link  between  board  independence  and
illingness  to  show  the  ﬁrm’s  ethical  behaviour.
Additionally,  we  detect  that  the  investor  protection  exist-
ng  in  the  corporate  context  in  which  the  company  operates
nﬂuences  the  extent  of  the  impact  of  independent  direc-
ors  on  the  development  of  more  complex  codes.  Hence,
irectors  of  companies  in  countries  with  a  lower  level  of
nvestor  protection  have  more  difﬁculty  in  implementing
thical  codes  with  a  wider  range  of  contents.  This  result
einforces  the  previous  evidence  found  by  Beck  et  al.  (2003)
r  Shen  and  Chih  (2005), which  show  a  complementary  link
etween  internal  and  external  mechanisms  of  corporate
overnance.
This  study  is  structured  as  follows.  The  section  ‘‘Ethical
odes’’  describes  ethical  codes  as  a  mechanism  for  com-
ating  unethical  practices  and  the  importance  of  the  board
n  ensuring  their  effectiveness.  The  section  ‘‘The  ethical
ole  of  independent  directors’’  contains  the  main  research
ypotheses,  related  to  the  role  played  by  independent  direc-
ors  in  implementing  more  complex  ethical  codes  and  the
tronger  inﬂuence  expected  in  those  countries  with  greater
nvestor  protection.  The  fourth  section  presents  the  sample
nalysed,  the  variables  used  to  test  the  hypotheses,  and  the
odels  proposed.  The  section  ‘‘Empirical  analysis’’  explains
he  results  obtained  after  estimating  the  original  models  and
ndertaking  some  sensitivity  analyses,  and  ﬁnally  section
‘Conclusions’’  summarizes  and  concludes.
thical codesusiness  ethics  can  be  understood  as  the  set  of  values,
orms,  and  principles  that  seek  to  achieve  respect  for  the
ights  generally  recognized  within  a society.  To  institutional-
ze  ethical  conduct  within  corporations,  speciﬁc  codes  have
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of  policies  on  business  ethics  is  similar  in  all  corporate
environments  (Bebchuk  and  Weisbach,  2010).  Firstly,  thisBoard  independence  and  ethical  behaviour  
been  developed.  According  to  Kaptein  and  Schwartz  (2008,
p.  113),  such  a  code  should  constitute  ‘‘a  distinct  and  for-
mal  document  containing  a  set  of  prescriptions  developed
by  and  for  a  company  to  guide  present  and  future  behaviour
on  multiple  issues  of  at  least  its  managers  and  employees
toward  one  another,  the  company,  external  stakeholders
and/or  society  in  general’’.
More  speciﬁcally,  codes  transmit  ethical  values  to  mem-
bers  of  the  organization  (Wotruba  et  al.,  2001),  offering
them  moral  guides  or  anchors  when  new  and  confusing  situa-
tions  are  encountered  in  the  workplace  (Chua  and  Rahman,
2011)  and  in  decision  making  (Urbany,  2005).
The  existence  of  a  code  of  ethics  was  initially  considered
as  preventive  medicine  against  fraud,  misappropriation,
embezzlement,  nepotism,  cronyism,  favouritism,  abuse  of
inﬂuence,  abuse  of  power,  the  illegal  ﬁnancing  of  politi-
cal  parties,  the  misuse  of  privileged  information,  workplace
mobbing,  defamation,  false  advertising,  negligent  discrim-
ination,  and  environmental  actions,  among  other  unethical
practices.  However,  several  studies  have  shown  that  the
mere  existence  of  such  a  code  does  not  guarantee  ethical
business  behaviour  (Vethouse  and  Kandogan,  2007;  Kaptein
and  Schwartz,  2008).
In  this  respect,  Ibrahim  et  al.  (2009),  Kaptein  (2011),
and  Singh  (2011)  observed  that  the  existence  of  train-
ing  programmes  and  communication  channels  to  familiarize
users  with  the  content  and  intent  of  this  code  will  improve
its  effectiveness.  It  has  been  shown  that  the  key  factor
in  successfully  inﬂuencing  the  behaviour  of  company  staff
is  the  actual  content  of  the  ethical  code;  this  is  what
determines  its  impact  on  managers’  judgements  and  deci-
sions.
Additionally,  the  factor  of  corporate  governance  is  of  cru-
cial  importance  in  ensuring  the  effectiveness  of  codes  of
ethics.  Many  previous  studies  on  the  practice  of  corporate
ethics  have  highlighted  the  need  for  the  involvement  and
commitment  of  the  senior  management  and  its  delegate
bodies  to  ensure  the  effectiveness  of  an  ethics  programme
(Weaver  et  al.,  1999).  Maintaining  organizational  integrity
and  ethics  is  assumed  to  be  among  the  skills  that  direc-
tors  and  managers  should  actively  practice  (Vethouse  and
Kandogan,  2007).  Consequently,  according  to  Bonn  and
Fisher  (2005),  boards  and  senior  management  need  actively
to  promote,  manage,  and  monitor  a  culture  that  empha-
sizes  ethical  behaviour  and  integrity  within  the  organization.
They  should  evaluate  its  current  strategies,  policies,  and
procedures  and  investigate  whether  ethical  behaviour  is
encouraged  and  the  company’s  ethical  values  are  reﬂected.
The  primary  goal  should  be  to  develop  an  ethical  code  set-
ting  out  the  recommendations  and  principles  to  be  followed
in  a  wide  range  of  situations.  This  is  regarded  as  the  most
important  factor  underlying  the  achievement  of  more  ethi-
cal  business  behaviour  (Ibrahim  et  al.,  2009;  Kaptein,  2011;
Singh,  2011).
According  to  Schwartz  et  al.  (2005),  board  members
are  ultimately  responsible  for  the  selection,  permanence,
and  discipline  of  senior  ofﬁcers  and  must  take  their  ethi-
cal  obligations  into  account.  Furthermore,  the  main  codes
of  corporate  governance  applicable  in  different  countries
state  that  among  the  board’s  functions  is  that  of  ensur-
ing  ethical  conduct  within  the  organization  (Aguilera  and
Cuervo-Cazurra,  2009).
d
(83
he ethical role of  independent directors
ndependent  directors  have  a  particular  responsibility  to
afeguard  the  interests  of  shareholders  and  investors.  They
upervise  the  senior  management  and  ensure  that  business
thics  form  part  of  the  organizational  culture  (Rodríguez
omínguez  et  al.,  2009).  One  ethical  policy  is  to  encourage
he  adoption  of  complex  ethical  codes  to  restrain  inap-
ropriate  actions  and  maintain  the  ﬁrm’s  good  image  and
ong-term  survival  (Singh,  2011).
In  addition  to  their  stipulated  functions,  independent
irectors  are  argued  to  be  the  best  equipped  and  most
ppropriate  board  members  to  take  responsibility  for
ompliance  with  the  regulations  and  to  ensure  the  ethi-
al  behaviour  of  the  ﬁrm  (Ibrahim  and  Angelidis,  1995).
his  is  due  to  their  greater  objectivity  and  independence
n  analysing  the  management  process  (Prado-Lorenzo  and
arcía-Sánchez,  2010),  as  well  as  the  impact  of  their  suc-
ess  or  otherwise,  in  this  respect,  on  their  personal  standing
Frías-Aceituno  et  al.,  2012).
Fama  and  Jensen  (1983)  and  Lorsch  and  Maciver  (1989)
rgued  that  the  main  beneﬁts  enjoyed  by  independent  direc-
ors  are  prestige,  reputation,  job  openings,  and  networking
pportunities.  Directors  who  perform  their  duties  effec-
ively  and  efﬁciently  are  more  likely  to  be  rewarded,  while
hose  who  work  in  companies  that  obtain  poor  results  will
end  to  lose  privileges.
Homstrom  (1999)  observed  that  concerns  about  the  ﬁrm’s
eputation  can  create  incentives  for  directors  to  avoid  risky
ctions  that  could  have  negative  consequences  for  their
uture  as  external  directors.  Any  loss  of  reputation  would
educe  their  chances  of  being  offered  another  such  post
Srinivasan,  2005;  Fich  and  Shivdasani,  2007)  and  even  of
etaining  their  present  one  (Fahlenbrach  et  al.,  2010).  In
ddition,  these  directors  will  have  a  more  critical  view  of  the
orporate  activities  that  may  be  carried  out,  having  greater
reedom  to  defend  costly  and/or  unpopular  decisions  (Arora
nd  Dharwadkar,  2011).
As  mentioned  previously,  their  role  may  be  especially
utstanding  when  dealing  with  ethical  issues.  They  may  be
ess  reluctant  to  investigate/prevent  cases  of  fraud  (Beasley,
996).  Furthermore,  they  will  be  more  receptive  to  the
emands  of  external  groups  for  improved  ethical  behaviour
y  the  company  and  will  seek  to  encourage  internal  groups  to
eet  the  goals  of  good  governance  (Fombrum  and  Shanley,
990).  Given  that  (1)  one  of  the  board’s  functions  concerns
nsuring  ethical  conduct  within  the  organization  (Aguilera
nd  Cuervo-Cazurra,  2009),  (2)  their  ethical  functions  may
e  better  fulﬁlled  in  the  presence  of  independent  direc-
ors  (Ibrahim  and  Angelidis,  1995),  and  (3)  ethical  issues  are
ainly  dealt  with  through  codes  of  ethics,  we  posit  our  ﬁrst
esearch  hypothesis:
ypothesis  1.  The  presence  of  independent  directors
ncourages  the  implementation  of  ethical  codes.
A  further  stage  in  this  analysis  is  to  determine  whether
he  involvement  of  independent  directors  in  the  deﬁnitionebate  is  based  on  the  arguments  of  Ravina  and  Sapienza
2010),  for  whom  the  decisions  of  independent  directors
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re  determined  by  the  satisfaction  of  their  own  utility
unction  as  economic  agents.  Furthermore,  the  earlier
mpirical  evidence  shows  that  the  functioning  of  the  inter-
al  mechanisms  of  corporate  governance  (e.g.  boards  and
heir  independence)  cannot  be  understood  without  con-
idering  the  mechanisms  associated  with  the  institutional
nvironment  proposed  by  La  Porta  et  al.  (1997,  1998,
000).
La  Porta  et  al.  argued  that  the  laws  protecting  the  rights
f  investors  and  the  degree  of  effective  implementation
f  these  laws  are  the  main  determinants  of  the  way  in
hich  corporate  governance  develops.  Investor  protection  is
nderstood  as  the  degree  to  which  business  legislation  and
ts  application  protect  investors  from  the  expropriation  that
ay  be  conducted  by  insiders.  Greater  legal  protection  for
nvestors  would  restrain  the  behaviour  of  directors,  limiting
heir  chances  to  engage  in  opportunistic  behaviour  and  pre-
enting  insiders  from  obtaining  private  beneﬁt  (Hart,  1995;
jankov  et  al.,  2005).
Therefore,  the  extent  of  investor  protection  may  inﬂu-
nce  directors’  impact  on  ethical  issues,  particularly  when
he  directors  come  from  outside  the  company,  like  inde-
endent  ones.  More  speciﬁcally,  there  are  three  possible
cenarios  regarding  the  moderating  role  of  investor  protec-
ion  in  the  ethical  commitment  of  independent  directors.  In
he  ﬁrst  such  scenario,  the  least  plausible  one,  the  effect
ould  be  neutral.  These  directors  would  perform  their  roles
n  the  same  way  worldwide,  with  no  inﬂuence  being  exerted
y  the  institutional  environment.  The  other  two  scenar-
os  require  us  to  consider  systemic  variations  in  directors’
ehaviour,  as  a  result  of  the  incentives  provided  in  different
nstitutional  settings.
The  second  scenario  assumes  a  substitutive  relation-
hip  between  corporate  governance  mechanisms.  Along  this
ine,  Doidge  et  al.  (2004)  suggested  a  negative  relationship
etween  the  strength  of  ﬁrm-level  governance  and  country-
evel  laws.  Thus,  the  independent  directors  of  companies
ocated  in  countries  with  less  investor  protection  would  be
xpected  to  take  a  more  active  role  in  developing  com-
lex  ethical  codes  than  other  directors.  They  would  seek
he  adoption  of  better  ﬁrm-level  governance  to  offset  the
eaknesses  in  the  law  or  in  its  application  and  indicate  their
ntention  to  offer  more  rights  to  investors.
The  third  scenario  follows  the  complementary  argument
roposed  by  Doidge  et  al.  (2004),  according  to  which  the
wo  mechanisms  are  mutually  reinforcing.  In  this  situation,
n  countries  where  the  regulatory  and  business  environment
ffers  greater  investor  protection,  independent  directors
re  expected  to  take  a  more  active  role  in  developing  com-
lex  ethical  codes  than  the  other  directors.  Within  this
elationship,  the  combination  of  interventionism  by  the
ndependent  directors  and  the  strength  of  the  legal  and  judi-
ial  protection  of  investor  rights  would  ensure  the  highest
egree  of  investor  protection.
Empirically,  although  there  is  no  clear  evidence  of  the
nteraction  with  the  institutional  environment  that  could
mpact  on  the  behaviour  of  independent  directors,  the  ﬁrst
cenario  should  be  rejected.  Rather,  previous  research  has
evealed  the  existence  of  substitutive  (Denis  and  Kruse,
000;  Huson  et  al.,  2001;  Aggarwal  et  al.,  2009)  and  com-
lementary  effects  (Claessens  et  al.,  2000;  Gul  et  al.,  2002;
eck  et  al.,  2003;  Leuz  et  al.,  2003;  Shen  and  Chih,  2005)
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etween  diverse  internal  and  external  mechanisms  of  cor-
orate  governance.
In this  paper,  we  argue  that  the  effect  of  the  level  of
nvestor  protection  on  managers’  ethical  commitment  will
e  complementary,  as  the  consequence  of  rational  decisions
ade  by  directors  in  their  role  as  economic  agents.  More
peciﬁcally,  we  suggest  that  in  the  decisions  taken  as  eco-
omic  agents,  managers  will  realize  that  the  development
f  ethical  codes  is  the  outcome  of  demands  in  this  respect
ade  by  social  activists,  regulators,  environmental  legisla-
ive  pressure,  etc.  Their  implementation  is  also  the  result
f  external  pressure  from  investors  and  other  capital  mar-
et  agents,  who  seek  to  protect  the  company  and  secure  it
gainst  potential  unethical  conduct  (Stevens  et  al.,  2005;
obertson  et  al.,  2013).
Moreover,  managers  will  consider  that  the  positive  out-
ome  obtained  from  effective  codes  is  not  limited  to  the
ompany’s  internal  affairs,  i.e.,  achieving  more  ethical
ehaviour,  developing  a  comprehensive  ethical  culture,  and
ncreasing  employee  satisfaction.  It  will  also  be  transferred
o  its  external  representation,  enhancing  institutional  legit-
macy  and  improving  the  organizational  approach  to  public
ccountability  (Valentine  and  Fleischman,  2008).  All  of  these
spects  promote  a  positive  external  image  of  the  ﬁrm;  they
nﬂuence  shareholders’  perceptions,  generate  reputational
eneﬁts  (Stevens  et  al.,  2005),  and  improve  ﬁnancial  perfor-
ance  (Weigelt  and  Camerer,  1988;  Stevens  et  al.,  2005).
Both  the  pressure  from  investors  and  the  beneﬁts  gener-
ted  by  the  adoption  of  a  code  of  ethics  are  more  apparent
n  capital  markets  that  are  more  developed  and  transpar-
nt.  Given  that  these  characteristics  are  usually  typical
f  countries  with  higher  levels  of  investor  protection  (La
orta  et  al.,  1998),  independent  directors  will  obtain  greater
eneﬁts  from  their  involvement  in  ethical  issues  in  these
ountries.  In  other  words,  these  directors  will  view  a  code
f  ethics  as  a  crucial  component  of  the  company’s  ethical
nfrastructure.  A  code  will  contribute  to  the  development
f  a  culture  and  an  image  that  will  maintain  or  restore
he  ﬁrm’s  ethical  reputation  vis-à-vis  its  stakeholders,  espe-
ially  investors  (McKinney  et  al.,  2010).  In  addition,  it  will
elp  raise  public  conﬁdence  in  the  ﬁrm’s  conduct,  inﬂu-
ncing  external  impressions  of  its  directors’  work,  and  thus
elp  them  to  achieve  greater  professional  recognition  and
rovide  more  opportunities  for  participation  in  other  boards
f  directors.
Therefore,  we  suggest  that  the  business  environment  for
ompanies  located  in  countries  with  strong  investor  pro-
ection  will  be  more  suitable  for  independent  directors  to
ssume  a more  interventionist  outlook  with  respect  to  the
rm’s  policy  on  ethical  issues.  In  those  contexts,  they  enjoy
reater  ﬂexibility  to  implement  a  more  complex  ethical
ode,  thereby  enhancing  investor  protection.  On  the  con-
rary,  the  managers  of  companies  located  in  countries  with
ess  investor  protection  have  greater  potential  to  obtain  pri-
ate  beneﬁts  (Nenova,  2003;  Dyck  and  Zingales,  2004);  thus,
hey  will  present  stronger  opposition  to  mechanisms  that
imit  opportunistic  conduct  (Renders  and  Gaeremync,  2007).
n  this  line,  the  following  hypothesis  is  proposed:ypothesis  2.  The  implementation  of  ethical  codes  on
ehalf  of  independent  directors  is  more  active  in  countries
ith  stronger  investor  protection.
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Table  1  Sampling  distribution,  by  countries.
Country  Sampling  period  Total  Frequency
2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009
Germany  0  0  0  34  44  42  30  150  2.79%
Canada 48  54  50  57  54  54  56  373  6.93%
Denmark 0  0  0  0  16  16  15  47  0.87%
Finland 0  0  0  0  19  19  18  56  1.04%
France 0  0  0  0  36  38  38  112  4.98%
Italy 34  35  39  41  42  41  36  268  4.98%
Netherlands  23  25  26  26  25  24  23  172  3.20%
Norway 0  0  0  0  10  10  10  30  0.56%
Spain 32  34  37  38  37  36  36  250  4.65%
Sweden 0  0  0  0  41  39  39  119  2.21%
UK 115  127  129  136  140  140  130  917  17.04%
USA 365  382  412  422  424  448  433  2886  53.64%
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Research methodology
Population  and  study  sample
The  study  population  is  comprised  of  the  listed  European,
US,  and  Canadian  companies  for  which  economic--ﬁnancial
data  are  available  in  Compustat,  together  with  the  data
relating  to  corporate  governance  and  ethical  codes  pub-
lished  by  Ethical  Investment  Research  and  Information
Services  (EIRIS).  Merging  the  two  databases  provided  a sam-
ple  of  5380  observations  for  an  average  of  760  companies
from  12  countries,  for  the  analysis  period  2003--2009.  The
panel  data  sample  is  non-balanced,  as  not  all  companies
were  observed  for  all  the  ﬁnancial  years  in  question;  thus,
the  number  of  ﬁrms  observed  ranged  from  617  to  907  for
this  period.
The  EIRIS  database  contains  information  on  the  corporate
social  responsibility  practices  of  the  3000  largest  companies
worldwide.  The  information  is  mainly  obtained  from  public
data,  although  questionnaires  are  used  to  ascertain  unpub-
lished  or  unclear  data.  Subsequently,  these  data  are  checked
by  external  experts,  unrelated  to  EIRIS  and  the  companies  in
question.  This  methodology  has  been  awarded  the  AI  CSRR
Voluntary  Quality  Standard.  Its  main  customers  include  the
FTSE  indices,  the  stock  exchanges  in  Johannesburg  and  Mex-
ico,  and  brokers,  asset  managers,  etc.  in  Europe,  North
America,  Australia,  and  Asia.
As  shown  in  Table  1,  there  is  a  bias  in  the  sample  dis-
tribution  due  to  the  weight  of  the  number  of  companies  in
the  USA  and  the  UK.  This  results  from  the  size  bias  of  the
companies  making  up  the  EIRIS  database.  From  the  tempo-
ral  point  of  view,  the  highest  number  of  observations  was
obtained  for  2008.
Dependent  variableThe  dependent  variable,  CElevel,  was  deﬁned  to  rep-
resent  the  implementation  of  a  code  of  ethics  in  two
ways:  its  existence  and  its  level  of  application.  This  is
an  ordinal  variable  that  takes  values  between  0  and
i
c
wigure  1  Evolution  of  the  level  of  application  of  the  ethical
odes  applied.
 by  identifying  the  level  or  inclusivity  of  the  ethical
ode.
 A  value  of  1  represents  limited  inclusion,  i.e.,  the  code
refers  to  a  very  limited  number  of  aspects,  such  as  con-
ﬂicts  of  interest,  corruption,  and  bribery.
 A  value  of  2  is  a  basic  level,  incorporating,  in  addition
to  the  ﬁrst  level,  recommendations  on  questions  such  as
discrimination,  occupational  hazards,  the  work  environ-
ment,  and  the  conﬁdentiality  of  information.
 A  value  of  3,  the  intermediate  level,  incorporates,  as  well
as  the  aspects  addressed  in  the  two  previous  levels,  the
principles  and  values  related  to  relationships  with  cus-
tomers,  suppliers,  and  competitors.
 A  value  of  4,  the  advanced  level,  adds  references  to  the
sustainable  use  of  resources,  relations  with  society,  and
any  other  value  that  forms  part  of  the  corporate  culture.
 The  value  of  0  is  assigned  to  companies  that  do  not  express
any  ethical  commitment.
Table  2  shows  that  96.7%  of  the  companies  listed  had
mplemented  a  code  of  ethics.  Regarding  the  level  of  these
odes,  12.7%  were  classed  as  limited  or  basic,  while  27.6%
ere  intermediate  and  56.4%  advanced.
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Table  2  Level  of  application  and  awareness  of  ethical  codes.
2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  Absolute  frequency  Relative  frequency
0  77  11  12  11  18  15  5  149  3.3
1 106  37  30  23  27  24  14  261  5.0
2 60  49  57  59  68  68  54  415  7.7
3 130  213  226  220  231  243  231  1494  2.6
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Regarding  the  evolution  in  this  ﬁeld,  Fig.  1  shows  that
here  has  been  a  signiﬁcant  decrease  in  the  number  of  com-
anies  that  either  do  not  have  a  code  of  ethics  or  have
ne  of  only  limited  reach.  On  the  contrary,  a  correspond-
ng  increase  occurred  in  the  numbers  of  companies  classiﬁed
s  intermediate  or  advanced  in  this  respect.  Furthermore,
uring  the  period  examined,  the  number  of  companies  of
hich  the  ethical  codes  were  considered  basic  remained
nchanged,  but  there  was  a  very  signiﬁcant  increase  in  the
umber  of  companies  that  implemented  advanced  codes  of
thics,  in  terms  of  the  recommendations  made.
ndependent  and  control  variables
o  test  hypothesis  H1,  we  deﬁned  as  the  independent  vari-
ble  %INDEP,  representing  the  percentage  of  independent
irectors  on  the  board  of  directors  of  each  company.  A  time
ag  was  applied  to  the  variable  to  avoid  potential  problems
f  endogeneity  arising  from  the  fact  that  the  more  ethical
ompanies  may  promote  a  greater  presence  of  independent
irectors  on  their  boards.
In  analysing  hypothesis  H2,  we  must  ﬁrst  deﬁne  the  insti-
utional  environment.  In  this  respect,  Chong  and  López-
e-Silanes  (2007),  among  others,  suggested  that  investor
rotection  should  be  deﬁned  in  terms  of:  (1)  the  tradi-
ion  and  the  existence  of  laws  that  safeguard  the  interests
f  investors  and  (2)  the  characteristics  of  the  judicial
nstitutions  created  to  ensure  their  implementation  and
nforcement;  in  this  sense,  judicial  support  for  the  appli-
able  rules  and  laws  has  the  power  to  prevent,  or  at  least
imit,  the  expropriation  of  investors.
The  underlying  legal  tradition  is  the  foundation  of  basic
egal  rights,  including  the  protection  of  property  rights,  and
he  bedrock  of  corporate  and  securities  law.  La  Porta  et  al.
1998)  classiﬁed  legal  traditions  into  two  families,  com-
on  law  and  civil  law.  Common  law  countries  developed
 legal  tradition  based  on  customary  law,  characterized  by
ess  reliance  on  the  statutes  and  a  preference  for  contracts
nd  private  litigation  to  resolve  disputes.  In  contrast,  civil
aw  countries  are  characterized  by  greater  explicit  reliance
n  laws  and  procedural  codes  and  by  the  preference  for
he  state  to  regulate  the  resolution  of  private  disputes.  In
his  sense,  common  law  environments  offer  greater  protec-
ion  for  investors  because  of  their  strong  focus  on  private
ontracts  and  the  protection  of  property  rights.
Therefore,  our  ﬁrst  variable  in  investor  protection  is  that
f  the  legal  tradition,  and  this  is  encoded  by  a  dummy  vari-
ble  that  takes  the  value  1  for  countries  with  a  common  law
egal  tradition  and  the  value  0  otherwise.
A  second  level  of  investor  protection  is  provided  by
ommercial  law,  in  particular  the  legal  mechanisms  that
d
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rotect  investors,  alleviating  the  agency  problems  that  may
ccur.  La  Porta  et  al.  (1998)  developed  an  index  of  anti-
irector  rights  on  the  basis  of  the  presence/absence  of  six
peciﬁc  elements  of  investor  protection.  This  index  uses  six
alues  to  measure  the  ease  with  which  investors  can  exercise
heir  rights  in  response  to  opportunistic  behaviour.
The  third  level  of  protection  is  based  on  the  existence  of
ther  parameters  of  the  legal  system  (Deffains  and  Guigou,
002),  such  as  mechanisms  to  enforce  the  existing  regula-
ions,  which  can  alleviate  the  ﬁrm’s  ethical  problems.  In
his  respect,  Defond  and  Hung  (2004)  and  Durnev  et  al.
2004)  observed  that  the  strength  of  the  enforcement  con-
rol  mechanisms  is  more  signiﬁcant  than  the  mere  existence
f  a  broad  set  of  laws  governing  them.
To  characterize  the  mechanisms  supporting  legal  provi-
ions,  we  shall  use  two  indices  proposed  by  La  Porta  et  al.
1998)  to  assess  a  country’s  legal  framework:  the  index
f  judicial  efﬁciency  and  the  index  of  law  and  order.  The
rst  index  rates  the  independence  and  professionalism  of
he  judiciary  in  all  kinds  of  proceedings,  together  with  the
dequacy  of  its  time  scales,  especially  as  regards  the  reason-
bleness  of  judicial  delays.  The  law  and  order  index  concerns
he  generality  and  non-arbitrariness  of  rules,  their  compre-
ensiveness,  their  fairness,  etc.  Both  of  these  enforcement
ontrol  mechanisms  are  true  determinants  of  the  protection
f  investors’  rights  because  they  determine  the  responsi-
ility  of  company  managers  and  directors  (La  Porta  et  al.,
998).
To  operationalize  investor  protection  and  make  it  inter-
ctive  with  the  proxy  for  independence  (following  Hillier
t  al.,  2011),  we  created  three  sub-indices:  (1)  DCL,  which
akes  the  value  1  if  the  ﬁrm  is  located  in  a common  law
ountry  and  the  value  0  if  it  is  located  in  a civil  law  coun-
ry;  (2)  DAR,  which  takes  the  value  1  if  the  ﬁrm  is  located
n  a country  with  investor  protection  rights  that  are  more
estrictive  on  directors  than  the  median  level  in  the  sample
nd  0  otherwise;  and  (3)  DEF,  which  takes  the  value  1 if  the
rm  is  located  in  a  country  where  the  index  of  application
f  the  law  is  above  the  median  and  0  otherwise  --  the  latter
ndex  is  obtained  as  the  sum  of  the  indices  of  judicial  efﬁ-
iency  and  of  law  and  order.  Finally,  we  take  as  a  proxy  for
ffective  investor  protection  the  sum  of  the  three  dummy
ariables  --  DCL,  DEF,  and  DAR  --  and  construct  a  new  dummy
ariable,  DINV  PROTEC,  which  takes  the  value  1  if  the  ﬁrm  is
ocated  in  a  country  with  above-average  investor  protection
nd  0  otherwise.
Additionally,  in  order  to  test  the  role  of  independent
irectors  in  each  investor  protection  system,  we  inter-
cted  the  percentage  of  independent  directors  with  the
nvestor  protection  dummy.  This  interacted  variable  is
abelled  %INDEP*DINV  PROTEC  and  identiﬁes  the  percentage
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of  independent  directors  in  countries  with  an  above-average
level  of  investor  protection.  As  with  the  %INDEP  variable,  a
time  lag  is  applied  to  the  variable  in  order  to  avoid  problems
of  endogeneity.
To  eliminate  bias  from  the  results,  we  considered  a  set
of  control  variables  previously  shown  to  be  effective  in  this
respect:  board  diversity,  size,  and  activity,  company  size,
level  of  borrowing,  and  growth  opportunities.
The  numeric  variable  %FEM  represents  the  percentage
of  female  directors  on  the  company  board.  Gender  diver-
sity  plays  a  very  important  role  in  the  ethical  commitment
of  companies,  due  to  differences  in  the  ethical  frameworks
used  by  men  and  women  in  their  moral  judgements  (Harris,
1989;  Ibrahim  et  al.,  2009).  According  to  previous  studies
(Stultz,  1979;  Ibrahim  and  Angelidis,  1994;  García-Sánchez
et  al.,  2008;  Rodríguez  Domínguez  et  al.,  2009),  female
directors  are  usually  more  sensitive  to  ethical  issues.
The  numeric  variable  BOARDSIZE  represents  the  total
number  of  directors.  In  general,  large  boards  of  directors
have  more  serious  agency  problems  and  a  greater  need  for
ethical  codes  (García-Sánchez  et  al.,  2008).  The  BOARDSIZE2
variable  is  the  square  of  the  above  and  is  taken  into  con-
sideration  because  authors  such  as  Diwedi  and  Jain  (2005)
incorporated  this  value  into  their  analyses  in  order  to  test  for
a  possible  non-linear  relationship.  In  other  words,  the  gen-
eral  behaviour  of  the  board  may  be  modiﬁed  when  a  certain
board  size  is  exceeded.
The  BOARDACT  numeric  variable  measures  the  number
of  board  meetings  in  each  year.  The  effect  of  this  variable
is  not  clear  a  priori.  On  the  one  hand,  Lipton  and  Lorsch
(1992)  argued  that  active  directors  are  more  effective,  pre-
senting  a  greater  predisposition  towards  corporate  social
responsibility.  However,  a  large  number  of  meetings  may
simply  evidence  inoperability  and  the  fact  that  the  direc-
tors  are  taking  on  too  much,  negatively  affecting  business
management  (Vafeas,  1999).
The  indicator  of  company  size,  FIRMSIZE  (the  logarithm
of  total  assets),  is  valuable  because  of  this  factor’s  effect
on  the  processes  of  corporate  social  legitimation,  as  high-
lighted  in  studies  such  as  Hackston  and  Milne  (1996),  Archel
and  Lizarraga  (2001),  Gray  et  al.  (2001),  and  Archel  (2003).
The  level  of  company  debt,  LEVERAGE  (the  ratio  of  debt  to
equity),  is  another  factor  associated  with  the  development
of  codes  of  ethics,  especially  as  a  means  of  prevention  and
response  to  agency  conﬂicts  that  may  arise.  With  respect  to
growth  opportunities,  companies  with  high  MTB  values  (cal-
culated  as  the  ratio  between  the  market  value  and  the  book
value  of  business  assets),  comparably  with  expectations  for
the  legitimation  process,  are  expected  to  develop  ethical
codes  aimed  at  reducing  the  problems  of  asymmetric  infor-
mation;  this  enables  them  to  regulate  employee  behaviour
(Larrán  and  García-Meca,  2004;  Gandía  and  Pérez,  2005).
Finally,  the  industry  sector  variable  is  introduced  in  order
to  control  the  effect  of  the  ﬁrm’s  economic  activity  on  the
level  and  impact  of  ethical  codes;  some  industry  sectors  are
more  likely  to  establish  internal  rules  to  prevent  potential
unethical  situations  that  may  occur  in  relation  to  the  speciﬁc
activity  of  the  sector  (García-Sánchez  et  al.,  2008).Table  3  summarizes  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  varia-
bles  proposed  for  analysis.  As  can  be  seen,  on  average
boards  are  composed  of  11  directors,  presenting  a  level  of
activity  of  9  meetings  per  year.  The  average  proportion  of87
ndependent  directors  is  72.59%,  with  higher  levels  in  insti-
utional  environments  featuring  greater  investor  protection
81.40%).  The  average  presence  of  female  directors  is  very
ow  (7.98%).  The  majority  of  observations  (60.6%)  refer  to
nstitutional  settings  in  which  investor  protection  is  higher
han  the  average  level  for  our  sample.
Table  3  also  shows  that  the  average  MTB  ratio  is  1.80,
.e.,  the  market  value  exceeds  the  book  value  of  the  busi-
ess  assets,  indicating  that  investors  expect  to  obtain  added
alue  in  the  future,  in  view  of  the  current  value  of  company
ssets.  Finally,  these  companies  have  an  average  debt  ratio
f  16.56%,  which  is  notably  lower  than  the  21.58%  observed
n  other  studies  with  international  samples  (Brockman  et  al.,
013).  This  variable  has  a  standard  deviation  of  55.66,  indi-
ating  a  high  degree  of  dispersion.  To  test  the  effect  of  this
isparity,  two  analyses  were  conducted,  the  ﬁrst  with  the
riginal  values  and  the  second  after  eliminating  outliers.
s  no  changes  were  observed  in  the  results  obtained,  we
ecided  to  retain  the  original  values  in  the  analysis.
nalytic  model
rom  the  hypotheses  set  out  and  the  variables  deﬁned
bove,  the  following  models  are  proposed:
Elevelit =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1%INDEPit−1 +  ˇ2DINV  PROTECit
+  ˇ3%FEMit +  ˇ4BOARDSIZEit +  ˇ5BOARDSIZE2it
+  ˇ6BOARDACTit +  ˇ7FIRMSIZEit +  ˇ8Leverageit
+  ˇ9MTBit +  ˇ10Sectorit +  ˇni Year  +  it +  i (1)
Elevelit =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1%INDEPit−1 +  ˇ2%INDEP
∗DINV  PROTECit−1 +  ˇ3DINV  PROTECit
+  ˇ4%FEMit +  ˇ5BOARDSIZEit +  ˇ6TAMCONS2it
+  ˇ7BOARDACTit +  ˇ8FIRMSIZEit +  ˇ9Leverageit
+  ˇ10MTBit +  ˇ11Sectorit +  ˇni Year  +  it +  i (2)
here
‘‘CElevel’’  is  an  ordinal  variable  that  takes  a value  from
0  to  4,  depending  on  the  level  of  application  of  the  com-
pany’s  ethical  code.
‘‘%INDEP’’  is  the  percentage  of  independent  directors  on
the  board  at  t  −  1.  This  is  interacted  with  the  variable
‘‘DINV PROTEC’’  to  identify  the  role  played  by  indepen-
dent  directors  at  t −  1  in  companies  located  in  countries
where  the  levels  of  investor  protection  are  above  average.
‘‘%FEM’’  represents  the  percentage  of  female  directors  on
the  board.
‘‘BOARDSIZE’’  is  a  numerical  variable  that  represents  the
total  number  of  directors,  both  internal  and  external,  on
the  board.
‘‘BOARDSIZE2’’  is  a  numerical  variable  that  represents  the
square  of  the  total  number  of  directors,  both  internal  and
external,  on  the  board.
‘‘BOARDACT’’  is  a  numerical  variable  that  reﬂects  the  num-
ber  of  board  meetings  held  each  year.
88  I.M.  García-Sánchez  et  al.
Table  3  Descriptive  statistics.
Min  Percentile  25  Median  Mean  Std  deviation  Percentile  75  Max
%INDEP  0.48 0.56 0.70  0.73  0.38  0.89  0.91
%INDEP*DINV  PROTEC  0.56  0.68  0.80  0.81  0.11  0.88  0.95
%FEM 0.00  0.00  0.75  0.08  0.14  0.13  0.15
BOARDSIZE 7.00  9.00  11.20  11.27  3.29  13.00  15.00
BOARDACT 4.00  6.00  8.50  8.59  3.80  10.00  12.00
FIRMSIZE 5.20  7.90  8.75  8.81  2.23  10.03  11.56
Leverage 6.23  8.75  16.50  16.56  55.66  24.67  25.49
MTB 1.01  1.45  1.70  1.80  1.70  3.75  4.20
Frequency
Absolute  Relative
DINV  PROTEC  3.259  60.6%
‘‘%INDEP’’ is the percentage of independent directors on the board. It interacts with the DINV PROTEC variable to identify the role
of independent directors in companies located in countries with above-average levels of investor protection. ‘‘%FEM’’ represents the
percentage of women on the board of directors. ‘‘BOARDSIZE’’ is a numeric variable representing the total number of board members,
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‘‘FIRMSIZE’’  is  the  size  of  the  company,  expressed  as  the
logarithm  of  its  total  assets.
‘‘Leverage’’  is  the  level  of  company  debt,  represented  by
the  borrowing/equity  ratio.
‘‘MTB’’  is  the  market-to-book  value  of  the  company.
‘‘Sector’’  is  a  numerical  variable  that  identiﬁes  the  area
of  activity  of  the  company.
‘‘Year’’  is  a  dummy  variable  vector  identifying  the  time
period  analysed.
The  dependent  variable  CElevel  takes  values  between
 and  4,  such  that  0  represents  the  absence  of  a  code  of
thics  and  4  represents  an  advanced  ethical  code,  with  the
ighest  rating.  Accordingly,  the  dependent  variable  is  an
rdinal  value.  Each  value  of  ‘‘CElevel’’  generates  a  contin-
ous  evaluation  of  the  company,  which  is  incorporated  into
n  unobserved  latent  variable,  which  we  term  ‘‘CElevel*’’.
his  variable  has  a  linear  shape  and  is  dependent  on  the
ame  independent  and  control  variables:
Elevel∗it =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1%INDEPit−1 +  ˇ2DINV  PROTECit
+  ˇ3%FEMit +  ˇ4BOARDSIZEit
+  ˇ5BOARDSIZE2it +  ˇ6BOARDACTit
+  ˇ7FIRMSIZEit +  ˇ8Leverageit +  ˇ9MTBit
+  ˇ10Sectorit +  ˇni Year  +  it +  i (3)
Elevel∗it =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1%INDEPit−1
+  ˇ2%INDEP  ∗  DINV  PROTECit−1
+  ˇ3DINV  PROTECit +  ˇ4%FEMit
+  ˇ5BOARDSIZEit +  ˇ6BOARDSIZE2it
+  ˇ7BOARDACTit +  ˇ8FIRMSIZEit
+  ˇ9Leverageit +  ˇ10MTBit +  ˇ11Sectorit
+  ˇni Year  +  it +  i (4)
a
i
t
phe number of board meetings held each year. ‘‘FIRMSIZE’’ is the
. ‘‘Leverage’’ is the level of corporate debt represented as the
e company compared to its book value.
As  there  are  a  limited  number  of  categories  of
‘CElevel’’,  this  variable  presents  various  cut-off  points,
elimiting  each  category,  as  follows:
Elevel  =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0  if  CElevel∗ <  cut1
1  if  cut1 <  CElevel∗ <  cut2
2  if  cut2 <  CElevel∗ <  cut3
3  if  cut3 <  CElevel∗ <  cut4
4  if  cut4 <  CElevel∗
Wooldridge  (2002)  proposed  two  approaches  for  estimat-
ng  panel  data  models  with  an  ordinal  dependent  variable.
he  one  that  is  most  commonly  used  assumes  that  the  it and
i errors  are  normally  distributed  and  is  estimated  by  maxi-
um  likelihood.  This  is  the  approach  implemented  in  STATA
y  Rabe-Hesketh  et  al.  (2001)  and  improved  by  Frechette
2001a,  2001b). The  programme  estimates  a  probit  model
ith  random  effects.  These  models  are  widely  used  in  anal-
ses  of  rating  agencies’  classiﬁcations  (Afonso  et  al.,  2007).
mpirical analysis
asic  estimations
able  4  summarizes  the  bivariate  correlations  for  the
ariables  considered  in  the  analysis.  The  most  signiﬁcant
elationships  with  the  dependent  variables  are  those  for  ﬁrm
ize,  the  size  and  degree  of  activity  of  the  board,  the  pres-
nce  of  independent  directors,  and  the  proportion  of  female
irectors.
Table  5  summarizes  the  results  obtained  from  the  two
nalytic  models  proposed:  Model  1  includes  the  proxy  for
ndependent  directors  overall,  while  Model  2  also  includes
he  interaction  of  this  variable  with  the  level  of  investor
rotection.
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Table  4  Bivariate  correlations.
CElevel  %INDEP  DINV  PROTEC  %INDEP*
DINV  PROTEC
%FEM  BOARDSIZE  BOARDACT  FIRMSIZE  Leverage  MTB
%INDEP  0.112**
DINV  PROTEC  0.072** 0.280**
%INDEP*
DINV  PROTEC
0.095** 0.321** 0.978**
%FEM  0.055** 0.259** 0.148** −0.127**
BOARDSIZE  0.026  −0.275** −0.071** −0.072** −0.101**
BOARDACT  0.035* −0.023  −0.005  0.015  0.045** 0.031*
FIRMSIZE  0.148** 0.087** 0.137** 0.145** 0.055** 0.324** 0.102**
Leverage  −0.019 0.014 0.013 0.013  −0.009  −0.015  −0.008  0.121**
MTB  −0.008 −0.004 −0.001 −0.001 −0.015 −0.016 0.001  −0.02  0.001
‘‘CElevel’’ is an ordinal variable, taking values from 0 to 4, according to the level of inclusion or application of the ﬁrm’s code of ethics.
‘‘%INDEP’’ is the percentage of independent directors on the board. It interacts with the DINV PROTEC variable to identify the role
of independent directors in companies located in countries with above-average levels of investor protection. ‘‘%FEM’’ represents the
percentage of women on the board of directors. ‘‘BOARDSIZE’’ is a numeric variable representing the total number of board members,
internal and external. ‘‘BOARDACT’’ is a numeric variable expressing the number of board meetings held each year. ‘‘FIRMSIZE’’ is the
size of the corporation, measured by the logarithm of its total assets. ‘‘Leverage’’ is the level of corporate debt represented as the
ratio external funds/equity. ‘‘MTB’’ represents the market value of the company compared to its book value.
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** The correlation is signiﬁcant at 0.01 (bilateral).
The  ﬁt  information  for  the  estimated  models  is
determined  by  the  log  likelihood,  which  controls  the  rep-
resentativity  of  each  equation.  Speciﬁcally,  to  establish  the
likelihood,  a  2 test  is  conducted  of  the  signiﬁcance  of  the
difference  between  the  value  of  the  log  likelihood  of  the
model  with  only  the  constant  and  that  of  the  full  model.  The
null  hypothesis  is  that  the  coefﬁcients  of  all  the  variables
included  in  the  ﬁnal  model  except  the  constant  are  equal
to  zero.  The  alternative  hypothesis  is  that  the  coefﬁcients
are  signiﬁcantly  different  from  zero.  If  the  probability  2
associated  with  the  test  value  is  less  than  0.05,  the  null
hypothesis  should  be  rejected,  accepting  that  the  ﬁnal  ordi-
nal  model  is  signiﬁcant  from  the  econometric  point  of  view
(Hair  et  al.,  1998).  The  level  of  representativity  is  deter-
mined  using  the  Wald  test,  which,  according  to  the  levels
of  signiﬁcance  obtained  will  lead  us  to  accept  or  reject
the  model  in  question.  The  p-values  of  all  the  models  are
statistically  signiﬁcant  at  the  conﬁdence  level  of  99%.  This
means  that  the  equations  adequately  explain  the  level  of
application  of  the  ethical  codes  examined.
Regarding  the  effect  of  the  explanatory  variables,  the  z
test  determines  whether  the  coefﬁcient  of  each  of  the  inde-
pendent  and  control  variables  considered  independently  has
a  value  that  is  signiﬁcantly  different  from  0.  In  other  words,
it  evidences  whether  it  has  a  real  effect  on  the  introduction
and  level  of  application  of  the  codes  of  ethics.  To  do  so,  the
probability  of  occurrence  should  be  less  than  0.05.  In  addi-
tion,  we  show  the  VIF  values  for  the  independent  variables
in  order  to  analyse  the  possible  multicollinearity  associated
with  the  consideration  of  linear  and  quadratic  measures  of
the  variables  or  the  interaction  among  them.  As  can  be  seen
in  the  results  table,  the  VIF  values  are  less  than  5,  so  the
existence  of  multicollinearity  is  rejected.In  this  respect,  for  Model  1  in  Table  5,  the  variable  %INDEP
has  a  positive  and  signiﬁcant  impact,  at  the  conﬁdence
level  of  99%,  on  the  dependent  variable  CElevel.  Therefore,
hypothesis  H1  is  accepted.
m
w
dMoreover,  Model  2  in  Table  5  indicates  that  the  variables
INDEP  and  %INDEP*DINV  PROTECT  have  a positive  impact
n  CElevel,  at  the  conﬁdence  level  of  95%.  Taken  together,
hese  results  show  that  the  independent  directors  of  com-
anies  located  in  countries  with  high  levels  of  investor
rotection  have  a  stronger  signiﬁcant  and  positive  effect  on
he  implementation  of  an  ethical  code  with  a  higher  level
f  application  (coef  =  0.24  +  1.37  =  1.61)  than  those  in  com-
anies  located  in  weaker  legal  environments  (coef  =  0.24).
n  conclusion,  the  results  obtained  for  Model  2  lead  us  to
ccept  hypothesis  H2.
Our  test  of  hypothesis  H1  shows  that  independent  direc-
ors  play  an  important  role  in  the  implementation  of  ethical
odes,  thus  carrying  out  the  duty  assigned  by  sharehol-
ers  regarding  the  supervision  of  the  management  team
Jensen,  1993).  These  results  reinforce  the  previous  empir-
cal  evidence  obtained  to  the  effect  that  these  directors
re  more  motivated  to  demonstrate  the  ﬁrm’s  ethical
ehaviour  (Ibrahim  and  Angelidis,  1995).  Accordingly,  they
ay  encourage  insiders  to  achieve  their  goals  by  means  of
ood  governance  (Fombrum  and  Shanley,  1990;  Johnson  and
reening,  1999).
Furthermore,  our  corroboration  of  hypothesis  H2  shows
hat  if  these  directors  perform  their  duties  in  companies
ocated  in  countries  with  greater  investor  protection,  they
ay  have  greater  incentives  to  develop  more  complex  eth-
cal  codes,  as  they  will  probably  be  more  aware  of  how  the
ompany  could  improve  its  relationships  with  its  sharehol-
ers  and  creditors.  In  addition,  in  institutional  environments
ith  weaker  investor  protection  laws,  it  is  likely  that  higher
rivate  beneﬁts  to  insiders  cause  them  to  present  greater
pposition  to  the  incorporation  of  corporate  governance
echanisms  to  limit  their  discretionary  powers.
Regarding  the  dummy  variable  representing  environ-
ents  characterized  by  high  levels  of  investor  protection,
hen  their  interaction  with  the  number  of  independent
irectors  is  not  considered,  the  impact  is  positive  but  not
90  I.M.  García-Sánchez  et  al.
Table  5  Explanatory  models  of  the  level  of  application  of  codes  of  ethics.
CElevelit =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1%INDEPit−1 +  ˇ2DINV  PROTECit +  ˇ3%FEMit +  ˇ4BOARDSIZEit +  ˇ5BOARDSIZE2it +  ˇ6BOARDACTit +
ˇ7FIRMSIZEit +  ˇ8Leverageit +  ˇ9MTBit +  ˇ10Sectorit +  ˇni Year  +  it +  i
CElevelit =  ˇ0+ˇ1%INDEPit−1 +  ˇ2%INDEP  ∗  DINV  PROTECit−1 +  ˇ3DINV  PROTECit +  ˇ4%FEMit +  ˇ5BOARDSIZEit +
ˇ6BOARDSIZE2it +  ˇ7BOARDACTit +  ˇ8FIRMSIZEit +  ˇ9Leverageit +  ˇ10MTBit +  ˇ11Sectorit +  ˇni Year  +  it +  i
Independent
variables
Model  1  Model  2
Coef.  Std.  Err.  VIF  Z  p  >  |z|  Coef.  Std.  Err.  VIF  Z  p  >  |z|
%INDEP  0.27  0.09  1.23  3.05  0.002  0.24  0.09  1.27  2.66  0.008
%INDEP*DINV  PROTEC  1.37  0.52  5.24  2.65  0.008
DINV PROTEC  0.12  0.13  1.19  0.91  0.362  −0.08  0.05  1.02  −1.71  0.087
%FEM 0.75  0.07  1.18  10.63  0.000  0.73  0.07  1.18  10.3  0.000
BOARDSIZE 0.20  0.05  4.23  3.81  0.000  0.20  0.06  4.28  3.46  0.001
BOARDSIZE2  −0.05  0.27  1.09  −0.17  0.866  −0.05  0.28  1.09  −0.19  0.851
BOARDACT 0.02  0.01  1.02  1.95  0.051  0.02  0.01  1.03  1.69  0.091
FIRMSIZE 0.09  0.02  1.15  4.97  0.000  0.09  0.02  1.15  4.55  0.000
Leverage 0.00  0.00  1.01  −1.64  0.101  0.00  0.00  1.01  −1.63  0.103
MTB 0.00  0.00  1.01  0.08  0.940  0.00  0.00  1.01  0.05  0.961
SECTOR −0.09  0.04  1.02  −2.03  0.042  −0.91  0.40  5.15  −2.25  0.024
D2005 −0.01  0.00  4.13  −3.21  0.001  −0.01  0.00  4.17  −3.01  0.003
D2006 0.96  0.07  1.21  13.32  0.000  0.94  0.07  1.21  12.75  0.000
D2007 1.21  0.07  1.23  16.48  0.000  1.18  0.07  1.23  15.79  0.000
D2008 1.17 0.07  1.24  15.97  0.000  1.13  0.08  1.24  14.67  0.000
D2009 1.50  0.10  1.19  14.61  0.000  1.47  0.10  1.19  14.26  0.000
cut1 −0.16 0.41  −0.39  0.699  −0.22  0.46  −0.48  0.633
cut2 0.67 0.41 1.66  0.097  0.62  0.46  1.35  0.178
cut3 1.40 0.41  3.45  0.001  1.34  0.46  2.94  0.003
cut4 3.03  0.41  7.43  0.000  2.97  0.46  6.49  0.000
rho 0.71 0.02  44.99  0.000  0.70  0.02  37.47  0.000
Log-likelihood  −3814.89  −3810.84
Chi-squared  542.02  550.13
p value  0.000  0.000
‘‘CElevel’’ is an ordinal variable, taking values from 0 to 4, according to the level of inclusion or application of the ﬁrm’s code of ethics.
‘‘%INDEP’’ is the percentage of independent directors on the board. It interacts with the DINV PROTEC variable to identify the role
of independent directors in companies located in countries with above-average levels of investor protection. ‘‘%FEM’’ represents the
percentage of women on the board of directors. ‘‘BOARDSIZE’’ is a numeric variable representing the total number of board members,
internal and external. ‘‘BOARDSIZE2’’ is a numeric variable representing the square of the total number of board members, internal
and external. ‘‘BOARDACT’’ is a numeric variable expressing the number of board meetings held each year. ‘‘FIRMSIZE’’ is the size
of the corporation, measured by the logarithm of its total assets. ‘‘Leverage’’ is the level of corporate debt represented as the ratio
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Statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients are shown in bold.
tatistically  signiﬁcant.  In  the  second  model,  the  impact  is
ositive,  but  the  non-signiﬁcance  remains.
The  proxy  for  the  activity  of  the  board,  BOARDACT,  has
 signiﬁcant  positive  effect  from  the  econometric  stand-
oint  for  the  CElevel  variable  in  the  ﬁrst  model,  for  an
stimated  conﬁdence  level  of  95%.  Therefore,  the  greater
he  number  of  board  meetings,  the  more  likely  the  company
s  to  implement  a  wide-ranging  code  of  ethics.  Its  directors
re  likely  to  participate  more  actively  and  to  have  a  more
irect  inﬂuence  on  the  company  strategy.  This  ﬁnding  sup-
orts  the  claims  of  authors  such  as  Lipton  and  Lorsch  (1992),
or  whom  active  boards  are  more  effective.  In  this  sense,
he  frequency  of  their  meetings  allows  them  to  supervise
he  management  of  the  company  better  and  demonstrates
heir  greater  interest  in  transparency  and  ethics.
The  size  of  the  board,  expressed  in  linear  terms,  BOARD-
IZE,  presents  a  direct  relationship  with  the  dependent
t
h
t
2any compared to its book value. ‘‘SECTOR’’ is a numeric variable
ariable  in  all  the  equations  considered.  On  the  other  hand,
ts  square,  BOARDSIZE2,  is  inversely  related  to  the  level  of
pplication  of  the  ethical  code,  although  this  is  not  rele-
ant  from  the  econometric  standpoint.  The  absence  of  a
elationship  in  the  latter  respect  shows  that  larger  boards
re  more  strongly  committed  to  ethical  issues.  A  possible
xplanation  for  this  is  that  such  a  board  will  be  guided  by
he  experience  and  knowledge  of  all  its  members  on  ethical
ssues.  In  addition  to  a  higher  frequency  of  board  meetings,
irectors  will  be  more  active  and  more  likely  to  participate
n  decision  making,  especially  regarding  the  content  and
evel  of  application  of  the  framework  document  for  com-
any  ethics.  Therefore,  companies  should  take  into  account
he  importance  of  the  size  of  the  board,  ensuring  that  it
as  sufﬁcient  members  to  control  the  management  effec-
ively  and  to  secure  ethical  decisions  (De  Villiers  et  al.,
011).
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Table  6  Robust  analysis  for  variations  in  the  level  of  application  of  codes  of  ethics.
CElevelit =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1%INDEPit−1 +  ˇ2%INDEP  ∗  DINV  PROTECit−1 +  ˇ3DINV  PROTECit +  ˇ4%FEMit +  ˇ5BOARDSIZEit +
ˇ6BOARDSIZE2it +  ˇ7BOARDACTit +  ˇ8FIRMSIZEit +  ˇ9Leverageit +  ˇ10MTBit +  ˇ11Sectorit +  ˇni Year  +  it +  i
Independent  variables  Coef.  Std.  Err.  VIF  Z  p  >  |z|
%INDEP  0.41 0.09 2.50 4.53 0.000
%INDEP*DINV  PROTEC  1.28  0.24  2.35  5.32  0.000
DINV PROTEC  −0.57  0.18  2.03  −3.11  0.002
%FEM 0.73  0.07  1.09  10.4  0.000
BOARDSIZE  0.17  0.05  4.27  3.19  0.001
BOARDSIZE2  −0.17  0.27  4.23  −0.65  0.515
BOARDACT  0.94  0.07  1.02  13.01  0.000
FIRMSIZE 0.09  0.02  1.15  4.85  0.000
Leverage 0.00 0.00 1.00  −1.62  0.105
MTB 0.00  0.00  1.01  0.20  0.842
SECTOR −0.08  0.03  1.02  −2.35  0.019
D2005 −0.01  0.00  1.18  −2.62  0.009
D2006 0.01  0.01  1.21  1.50  0.134
D2007 1.17  0.07  1.23  15.93  0.000
D2008 1.12 0.07  1.24  15.24  0.000
D2009 1.46  0.10  1.19  14.19  0.000
cut1 −0.09 0.43  −0.22  0.828
cut2 0.74  0.43  1.72  0.085
cut3 1.48 0.43  3.42  0.001
cut4 3.10 0.43 7.21  0.000
rho 0.70 0.02 40.14 0.000
Log-likelihood  −3803.70
Chi-squared  564.42
p-value  0.000
‘‘CElevel’’ is an ordinal variable, taking values from 0 to 4, according to the level of inclusion or application of the ﬁrm’s code of ethics.
‘‘%INDEP’’ is the percentage of independent directors on the board. It interacts with the DINV PROTEC variable to identify the role
of independent directors in companies located in countries with above-average levels of investor protection. ‘‘%FEM’’ represents the
percentage of women on the board of directors. ‘‘BOARDSIZE’’ is a numeric variable representing the total number of board members,
internal and external. ‘‘BOARDSIZE2’’ is a numeric variable representing the square of the total number of board members, internal
and external. ‘‘BOARDACT’’ is a numeric variable expressing the number of board meetings held each year. ‘‘FIRMSIZE’’ is the size
of the corporation, measured by the logarithm of its total assets. ‘‘Leverage’’ is the level of corporate debt represented as the ratio
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identifying the ﬁrm’s sector of activity.
Statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients are shown in bold.
Gender  diversity  (%FEM)  has  a  positive  impact,  at  the
99%  conﬁdence  level,  on  the  independent  variable,  CElevel.
This  ﬁnding  is  in  accordance  with  the  previous  literature,
which  points  out  that  female  board  members  are  more  sen-
sitive  to  ethical  questions.  They  usually  present  a  greater
concern  with  compliance  with  regulations  in  such  matters
and  in  meeting  the  requirements  of  different  stakeholders.
Additionally,  gender  diversity  is  associated  with  greater
experience  and  stricter  compliance  with  the  ﬁrm’s  legal  and
moral  obligations  (O’Neill  et  al.,  1989).  Thus,  this  ﬁnding
suggests  that  companies  wishing  to  achieve  higher  stan-
dards  of  ethical  behaviour  are  more  likely  to  succeed  if  they
include  a  greater  number  of  women  on  the  board.  These
results  are  consistent  with  those  of  previous  studies,  such
as  García-Sánchez  et  al.  (2008)  and  Rodríguez  Domínguez
et  al.  (2009).
With  respect  to  the  remaining  control  variables,  ﬁrm
size  (FIRMSIZE)  has  a  signiﬁcant  positive  effect  at  the  conﬁ-
dence  level  of  99%,  in  all  the  models  analysed.  The  SECTOR
variable  has  a  signiﬁcant  negative  effect  at  the  conﬁdence
level  of  95%.  The  control  variables  MTB  and  Leverage  have
t
i
pany compared to its book value. ‘‘SECTOR’’ is a numeric variable
 positive  non-signiﬁcant  coefﬁcient  in  the  models  consid-
red.  Thus,  we  conclude  that  larger  companies  can  access
ore  resources  with  which  to  address  ethical  issues.  Fur-
hermore,  they  present  more  extensive  publication  of  their
ctivities,  in  accordance  with  processes  of  legitimation
García-Sánchez  et  al.,  2008).
ensitivity  analysis
o  increase  the  robustness  of  the  results  presented  in  the
revious  section,  three  additional  robustness  analyses  were
arried  out.
In the  ﬁrst  such  analysis,  the  dummy  variable  for  investor
rotection  was  replaced  with  the  original  numerical  values.
n  addition,  a factor  analysis  was  performed  to  group  these
alues  into  a  single  component  and  to  interact  them  with
he  percentage  of  independent  directors.The  results  of  the  factor  analysis  yielded  a  single  factor
hat  accounts  for  75.48%  of  the  variance  of  the  four  numer-
cal  variables  selected  to  determine  the  level  of  investor
rotection.  The  anti-director  rights  index  has  a  load  factor
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f  0.947;  the  judicial  efﬁciency  index  one  of  0.890;  the
ommon-law  country  dummy  one  of  0.881;  and  the  index
f  law  and  order  one  of  0.744.
Subsequently,  we  ran  a  regression  in  which  this  factor
as  included  as  a  variable  identifying  the  level  of  investor
rotection,  as  well  as  its  interaction  with  the  number  of
ndependent  directors.  The  results  are  very  similar  to  those
btained  for  the  original  model.  Thus,  the  proportion  of
ndependent  directors  is  signiﬁcant  at  the  conﬁdence  level
f  99%,  with  a  coefﬁcient  of  0.46.  The  interaction  is  also
igniﬁcant,  at  the  same  level  of  conﬁdence,  presenting  a
oefﬁcient  of  1.39.  Taken  together,  these  results  show  that
he  independent  directors  of  companies  located  in  countries
ith  high  levels  of  investor  protection  have  a  signiﬁcant  and
ositive  effect  on  the  implementation  of  an  ethical  code
ith  a  higher  level  of  application  (coef  =  0.46  +  1.39  =  1.85)
ompared  with  companies  located  in  weaker  legal  environ-
ents  (coef  =  0.46).
In  the  second  robustness  analysis,  the  original  sample
as  divided  into  two  blocks  of  countries.  The  ﬁrst  block
omprised  Germany,  Norway,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  and
weden,  and  corresponded  to  companies  included  in  the
ample  for  the  period  2007--2009.  The  remaining  countries
ormed  the  second  subsample,  as  data  were  available  for
he  whole  period,  2003--2009.
For  the  ﬁrst  block  of  countries,  the  variables  %INDEP  and
INDEP*DINV PROTEC  are  signiﬁcant  at  the  conﬁdence  level
f  99%.  Once  again,  the  independent  directors  of  companies
ocated  in  countries  with  high  levels  of  investor  protection
ave  a  positive  and  signiﬁcant  effect  on  the  implementa-
ion  of  an  ethical  code  with  a  higher  level  of  application
coef  =  0.11  +  1.53  =  1.64)  compared  with  companies  located
n  weaker  legal  environments  (coef  =  0.11).  For  the  second
lock  of  countries  and  at  the  same  level  of  conﬁdence,  the
oefﬁcients  would  be  0.16  and  0.65,  respectively.  Thus,  the
esults  obtained  are  similar.
Finally,  in  the  third  robustness  analysis  (Table  6),  we
eﬁned  a  sample  from  the  companies  that  have  raised  the
evel  of  application  of  their  ethical  code  during  the  period
nalysed.  These  results  show  an  impact  of  0.41  for  %INDEP
nd  one  of  1.28  for  %INDEP*DINV  PROTEC.
onclusions
ecent  corporate  scandals  and  the  ﬁnancial  crisis  have  led
o  growing  concern  about  ethical  issues  and,  in  this  respect,
he  inﬂuence  of  good  governance  practices.  The  negative
ffect  of  unethical  business  practices  on  ﬁrms’  reputations
lso  affects  the  managers  involved  and,  hence,  the  body
esponsible  for  supervising  managers’  performance,  i.e.,  the
oard  of  directors.  This  effect  is  particularly  felt  by  the
ndependent  directors,  because  their  professional  capabili-
ies  are  thus  called  into  question.  This  can  often  result  in
he  loss  of  employment  opportunities  in  other  companies
nd  can  even  lead  to  the  ﬁrm  becoming  immersed  in  illegal
ctions.
In  order  to  avoid  this  damage  to  their  reputation,
hese  board  members  encourage  the  adoption  of  corporate
odes  of  conduct,  which  may  take  the  form  of  pragmatic
echanisms  to  be  implemented  when  individuals  prone  to
isconduct  violate  the  trust  placed  in  them  (Stevens  et  al.,
AI.M.  García-Sánchez  et  al.
005).  These  mechanisms  would  constitute  systems  and
rocedures  aimed  at  generating  conﬁdence  by  jeopardizing
iscretionality  and  managerial  opportunism.  Moreover,  they
ould  boost  market  conﬁdence  because  the  existence  of
uch  a  code  of  conduct  would  indicate  that  the  ﬁrm  behaves
n  accordance  with  the  ethical  and  legal  standards  expected
f  it.
Ideally,  these  ethical  guidelines  would  be  more  fully
eveloped  in  business  environments  with  weaker  legal
rameworks  as  regards  investor  protection,  in  order  to
rovide  alternative  sources  of  protection  for  shareholders
nd  creditors  and  to  prevent  managers  from  beneﬁting
rom  discretionary  decisions.  However,  the  results  obtained
ndicate  that  the  involvement  of  independent  directors  in
ctions  to  foster  ethical  behaviour  is  heightened  in  insti-
utional  settings  characterized  by  greater  protection  for
nvestors.  Therefore,  our  ﬁndings  indicate  that  board  inde-
endence  leads  to  more  complex  ethics  and  that  this
elationship  is  stronger  when  the  institutional  context  pro-
ides  investors  with  stronger  protection.
From  a  theoretical  standpoint,  there  cannot  be  said
o  be  any  homogeneity  of  corporate  governance  mech-
nisms  at  the  international  level.  Our  study  detected
omplementarity  between  the  internal  and  the  external
echanisms  that  prevent  the  illegal  forms  of  behaviour  that
ay  occur  in  multinational  companies.  These  results  have
nteresting  practical  implications,  suggesting  that  there  is  a
eed  for  regulatory  bodies  in  countries  with  a  less  favourable
nstitutional  environment  so  that  investors  can  participate
ore  actively  in  the  development  of  ethical  commitments.
hese  regulatory  bodies  would  establish  preventive  mech-
nisms  to  restrain  unethical  practices  and  issue  regulations
o  toughen  the  penalties  for  these  actions.
The  present  study  has  various  limitations,  which  will  be
ddressed  in  future  research  by  the  authors.  Thus,  the  sole
thical  commitment  assumed  was  that  of  the  existence  of  a
ode  of  ethics  and  its  level  of  application.  Future  research
hould  analyse  the  existence  of  other  documents  and  busi-
ess  procedures  aimed  at  preventing  unethical  actions,  such
s  money  laundering  and  bribery.
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